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Protection of Human Rights or State Sovereignty:
Which Way to Go?
Review Essay by Tarique Niazi PhD, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Eau
Claire, niazit@uwec.edu.
Hehir, A. & Murray, R. Protecting Human Rights in the 21st Century. London: Routledge.
Yilmaz, G. Minority Rights in Turkey: A Battlefield for Europeanization. London: Routledge,
2017.
The festering Syrian conflict has wrought havoc on human rights while the world looks on. The
world’s inaction in the face of shocking violence ostensibly forfeits any hope for the future of the
protection of human rights. Since its eruption in 2011, the conflict in Syria has claimed more
than half a million lives (Laub, 2017). By two years after the start of violence, almost half of
Syria’s 22 million citizens had left their homes and homeland (Tabler, 2013) to seek refuge
outside their nation’s borders. The plight of Syrian refugees is writ large on the teeming camps,
which dot borderlands in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, that house them. Meanwhile, hundreds
of thousands of refugees risked their lives and those of their loved ones on their journey across
the Mediterranean, hoping to find safety in Europe. Just in 2015, a million refugees made their
way into parts of southern and western Europe, especially Germany (Niazi, 2016), while millions
more remain in camps, nursing their dreams of getting there one day.
Xenophobic Backlash in Europe
The attempted and actual migration of Syrian refuges into Europe has resulted in a surge
of alt-right populist movements, the combustible, immigrant-loathing rhetoric of which has
inflamed popular sentiments and caused even mainstream European political parties to lurch
rightward. In this hostile environment, European governments have felt compelled to slam their
doors shut on incoming refugees. In fact, the toughening of immigration policy on the continent
has grown into a measure of leadership. Government leaders are now in competition with each
other to show who has most effectively shut their doors on immigrants. The Syrian calamity has
thus revealed the underside of Europe and its long-simmering xenophobia. Across the Atlantic,
the United States’ President Trump has barred Syrian refugees from entering the country
(Singhvi and Parlapiano, 2017), and the United States Supreme Court has partially validated the
president’s executive order (Liptak, 2017). Anti-immigration sentiments, doused with austerity
programs in Europe and belt-tightening in the United States, have turned European and
American governments and their citizens inward. Additionally, economic downturn caused cuts
in US military spending, which in turn led to scaling back of any overseas military initiatives that
did not have direct bearing on the United States’ strategic interests. Any residual concern in
Europe or the United States for human rights was dampened by the urgency of addressing the
most immediate needs at home. The daily grind of survival took precedence over protecting
rights in far off places, let alone committing blood and treasure on behalf of the rights of others
in distant lands. All this has built into a level of humanitarian uninterest and “unconcern” that
calls to mind parallels from pre-war Europe.
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Geopolitics Divides the International Community
The surge of popular indifference to human rights violations and senseless violence in
Syria has numbed the international community that stands divided on how to construe the Syrian
conflict and how to combat the concomitant refugee crisis. Geopolitical interests are at the root
of this division, which foreshadow the plight of millions of refugees. Many would think that if
there were ever a humanitarian disaster that could get the international community to speak with
one voice, it would be calamity in Syria. Instead, the international community stands frozen in
paralysis about how to find a unified voice on Syria, let alone what to do about it. The
consequences of this failure to pre-empt and prevent the Syrian disaster are widespread, which
has left scholars of human rights melancholic about the future of human rights protection.
Aidan Hehir and Robert Murray (2017), in their edited volume Protecting Human Rights
in the 21st Century, have voiced this melancholy but with a tinge of hope for the state of human
rights protection in the world. They have marshaled wide-ranging arguments about the future of
the protection and management of human rights, which in equal parts excite optimism and
pessimism. They then set out to steer an alternative path, away from both pessimism and
optimism. They call pessimists ‘fatalists,’ who are resigned to the fate of the faltering human
rights regime.1 On the other hand, they tag optimists ‘deniers,’ who refuse to see the obvious: a
worldwide slide in human rights protection. The work’s editors embed the debate on
humanitarian intervention within its classical context of liberalism, and build it up to its
contemporary iteration to explain the worsening of human rights conditions worldwide. They
argue that it is not just the “in-humanitarian non-intervention” in Syria that has begat the
mammoth refugee disaster. They assert that the botched “humanitarian intervention” in Libya2
also has contributed to intervention fatigue. Even though the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi
was not a poster-child for human rights protection, his violent ouster turned the country into a
slaughterhouse of human rights. In post-Gaddafi Libya, regional warlords, religious extremists,
hordes of IS (Islamic State) terrorists, and warring factions within the Western-backed
government in Tripoli are all guilty of egregious human rights violations.3
If intervention and non-intervention are both productive of humanitarian disasters, what,
then, is the way out? The instinctive response is order and stability within the safe borders of
sovereign states. Volume contributors, however, see in this default position a backward march or
a retreat to “order-oriented geopolitics.” They lament prioritizing ‘order’ over human rights
protection, which in their view often leads to more and outrageous rights violations committed
by errant states in the name of stability. When the state becomes the abuser of human rights,
volume contributors ask, who can and should protect human rights? The authors disagree with
letting states off the hook for committing rights abuses in the name of order, which they fear will
likely institutionalize the same sort of “order-oriented geopolitics” that marked the decades-long
cold war. With this line of thinking, they move the debate over interventionism and noninterventionism to embrace a new paradigm called “responsibility to protect” (R2P) in an effort
to address whose responsibility it is to protect the right-bearing individual members of society
when their own states are guilty of violating their rights.
R2P Changes Everything, or So It Was Thought
In 2005, the world leaders’ summit at the United Nations came close to answering the
question of who (if not states) ought to bear responsibility for protecting and maintaining human
rights. The summit presented the notion of a “responsibility to protect” and drafted a document
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that is widely known by its acronym, R2P, stating that if states violate the human rights of their
citizens, it becomes the responsibility of other global actors to protect the human rights of those
individuals. With its adoption, R2P changed the very concept of state from being an embodiment
of ‘absolute sovereignty’ to a possessor of ‘relative sovereignty.’ In absolute sovereignty, the
state’s right to national security overrides the protection of the rights of its citizens. The concept
of ‘relative security,’ on the other hand, expands the state’s responsibilities from those pertaining
to national security to include ‘human security’ and the protection of human rights. The
transformative nature of R2P had some hailing it effusively as “the most significant adjustment
to sovereignty in 360 years” (Axworthy and Rock, 2009, p.69). Others spotted in it an
international Magna Carta (Slaughter, 2011). Critics, on the contrary, dismissed this gush of
enthusing as ‘hubris’ (Kersten, 2015) that “irresponsibly increased expectations” (Hehir, 2017;
Gallagher, 2015) that the world’s players would rise to the occasion and protect the rights of
citizens in distant states. Still others saw R2P as empty of substance, which can be evident, as
Hehir (2017) notes, from the fact that states known to violate the rights of their citizens, such as
Bahrain, Qatar, Sudan, and North Korea, affirmed it just as warmly as France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Critics of R2P are not necessarily its rejectionists. They are,
rather, skeptics who would like to see it “change the world” but are not so sanguine about it
(Hehir, 2017; Gallagher, 2012).
Clanging Ideologies and Interventionism
Those who are opposed to humanitarian intervention are averse to the very idea of
international regulation and protection of human rights since it, in their view, likely opens the
pathway to interventionism. Sovereignty, for them, is ‘absolute,’ and they want “little scope for
the trans-state enforcement of human rights” (Hehir, 2017). This position is akin to that of
realists in international relations theory, who are absolutists on the primacy of state sovereignty.
Interestingly, Hehir (2017) has traced the absolutism of state sovereignty to classical liberalism,
which, in all irony, is not that far from that of realists’ absolutist position. Walzer (2011)
documents that traditional liberals, who argue against interventionism, invoke John Stuart Mill’s
famous exhortation against intervening in the affairs of a sovereign state. Realism and classical
liberalism thus share an antipathy towards interventionism, which in their respective views
violates state sovereignty. According to Jackson (2000), this aversion to interventionism found
favor with the pluralists in the tradition of the English school of thought on international
relations. More importantly, this aversion to humanitarian intervention flows in contradistinction
to the vociferous advocacy of “liberal internationalism” for a muscular foreign policy,
particularly since the tragic events of 9/11.
Interestingly, liberal internationalists parted ways with classical liberalism and its caution
against interventionism only to end up in bed with neo-conservatism, which champions the
spread of democracy and state-building as part of human rights protection. Advocacy for
democracy and state building in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, however, turned out to be
counterproductive, resulting in the rise of IS terrorists in Iraq and a seemingly endless war in
Afghanistan, which is the longest-running combat the United States has ever waged. Liberal
internationalism, volume contributors argue, overdosed on successful interventions in the 1990s,
an era that was billed as the “age of enforcement.” Humanitarian intervention towards the close
of the 20th century birthed independence for East Timor, South Sudan, and Kosovo. It was the
dizzying success of such interventionist efforts that made liberal internationalism bolder in its

Protection of Human Rights or State Sovereignty

115

push for democracy and state building in the 21st century, which respectively saw Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Libya invaded in 2001, 2003, and 2011. Nevertheless, humanitarian interventions at the
turn of the century failed to replicate the successes of those undertaken in the 1990s. The rather
unflattering outcomes of 21st century efforts injected a modicum of humility into neoconservatism and liberal internationalism for future such initiatives. The real casualty of these
bungled attempts, however, is the humanitarian concern, which, volume editors report, is
flagging worldwide. In the case of Syria, flagging concern seems to have grown into antipathy
towards humanitarian intervention, even where it is arguably most justifiable.
Finding a Way Forward
If R2P is not viable, and a return to order-oriented geopolitics risks rights violations,
what is the third way out? The edited volume offers a three-part analysis to address this question
and provide a solution that will sidestep the either/or dilemma of clinging to R2P or espousing
‘order’ over ‘rights.’ The analysis has been divided into three broad sections in the volume: The
first section revisits some of the assumptions that underlie humanitarian intervention and recasts
liberal internationalism by which the protection of human rights has long been understood and
practiced, especially since the 1990s, when the Cold War ended after the collapse of the Soviet
Union. This section contains four theoretically grounded essays that seek to rethink fundamental
principles such as the concepts of ‘rights,’ ‘humanity,’ ‘power,’ ‘constitutionalism,’ and ‘global
constitutionalism.’ This section also offers conceptual clarity on human rights, their basis in law,
and a shared concern that supposedly crosscuts geographical, cultural, and national distinctions.
The second section examines the very idea of ‘protection’ and particularly the idea of ‘protection
of civilians’ (POC), which is often presented as a more viable alternative to R2P. This section
consists of additional four essays that delve into major ideas underlying human rights. This
section particularly makes a distinction between the ideas of R2P and the ‘protection of citizens’
(POC), providing a robust critique of past and present instances of intervention and nonintervention, analyzing their respective outcomes and implications. Based on this analysis, the
section builds up to an alternative to humanitarian intervention in R2P. The third section is
entirely devoted to an analysis of the R2P as a concept. It critically examines its strengths and
weaknesses and strives to chart a way forward to more viable alternatives. In this section, R2P is
compared and contrasted with POC. There is a measure of evidence that seems to favor POC
over R2P, as the former is more palatable for states that feel alarmed by interventionism. Overall,
this section conducts a thorough discussion of R2P, along with its prospects and its perils. The
volume concludes with a thoughtful epilogue by co-editor Robert Murray (2017).
Way Forward is Potholed with Disagreements
The concerns that emerge from the conceptual, empirical, and policy discussions of
humanitarian intervention, R2P, and POC are multifarious. Of these, the most important include
power imbalance between the west and the rising rest; determining who is or who should be the
“rights enforcer(s),” and/or in whom should authority and responsibility for the enforcement be
vested; cross-cultural differences over notions of ‘rights protection’ and ‘state sovereignty; a
shared reluctance in the rising powers of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)
to assume enforcement responsibilities; and a selective bias in rights enforcement. Volume
contributors argue that power imbalance between western and non-western nations hinders
efforts to reach a consensus regarding the enforcement of human rights. This imbalance becomes
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an even bigger impediment when rights violators are non-western nations, and enforcers of rights
the western ones. Second, there is a disagreement as to who should enforce rights. The P5
nations (Britain, China, France, Russia, United States) at the United Nations’ Security Council
dominate the decision-making on enforcement, but their deliberations are stalled if there is no
nation or nations willing to commit diplomatic and military resources to the enforcement of
rights. Third, according to volume contributors, cross-cultural differences in regard to defining
and interpreting ‘rights’ and ‘state sovereignty’ further impede the enforcement of rights. Nonwestern nations tend to be more guarding of state sovereignty than of rights enforcement. Fourth,
say contributing authors, the emerging multipolar world further dilutes the human rights regime.
The multipolar world arose from the disintegration of the bipolar world (with the fall of
the Soviet Union in the 1990s), leading to the diffusion of world power across multiple poles and,
at first, the development of a unipolar world in which the United States was the ascendant power.
Critics (see e.g., Carafano, 2015) allege that the unipolar power of the U.S. began to shrink under
President Barrack Obama (2008-2016), who disengaged the United States from the world,
especially from rights enforcement. President Obama’s lack of response to the breach of his selfdrawn “redline” on the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in Syria, along with his
only reluctantly committing the United States to the supposedly humanitarian intervention in
Libya, earned him epithets such as “weak on defense” (Dwyer, 2012) and critiques that he was
content to “lead from behind” (Carafano, 2015), ultimately permitting Trump to campaign on the
promise of “enforcing Obama’s redline in Syria” (Lake, 2017). Under President Trump, however,
United States’ retreat from the world is even bolder—from mocking NATO to threats of pulling
out of NAFTA to actually pulling out of the Paris Climate Accord of 2015—although the U.S.’s
retreat is not unilateral, as the contributors to this work demonstrate.
The shift in the balance of power among global players from a unipolar to multipolar
world is also being fueled by the resistance on the part of new players in the multipolar world,
especially BRICS, to accept a uniform definition of rights and their enforcement. These powers
are particularly skeptical of humanitarian intervention, and more wedded to state sovereignty.
They are more willing to embrace the idea of protection of civilians (POC) than humanitarian
intervention or R2P. POC entails United Nations’ peacekeeping missions, which states suspected
of committing atrocities against their own citizens host—supposedly voluntarily—as Congo and
Sierra Leone have recently done. Several nations of BRICS happily contribute to these missions.
Of all P5 nations, China, for instance, has been the largest contributor of peacekeeping troops
(Fung, 2016). Since peacekeeping missions are subject to the consent of host states, they are
taken to be respectful of (or, minimally, the least violative of) state sovereignty, as compared to
any humanitarian intervention under R2P, which prioritizes rights enforcement over state
sovereignty.
Fifth, the contributing authors say, the selective enforcement of human rights (i.e., the
inconsistent application of rights enforcement based generally on other—unstated—political
agendas and objectives) has also fueled humanitarian unconcern. The determination of when and
where to enforce human rights comes with its own selectivity biases. As such, the selective
enforcement of human rights has been used as an implicit means of protecting allies, advancing
strategic interests, and extending geopolitical reach. For instance, human rights violations by
allies such as Brazil have been overlooked, while those of Venezuela’s flagged. Additionally, P5
nations have been reluctant to enforce rights in nations outside the radius of their strategic
interests. A singular case in point is the Rwandan massacre of 1994, during which the Rwandans
became the victims of the world’s malignant neglect and in which almost a million members of
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the Tutsi minority and their Hutu supporters were butchered in a fratricidal war (Niazi, 2002). In
this way, geopolitically important nations such as oil-rich Iraq and Libya become tempting
targets for humanitarian intervention, while geopolitically light-weights such as Syria are left
alone to collapse under the weight of their own tyranny, with millions suffering as a consequence.
Although each essay in this edited volume is a stand-alone masterpiece that engages with
statecraft across nations, regions, and the world, the most persuasive of them, however, are the
ones that further pessimist arguments, (i.e., asserting that humanitarian intervention has no
future). The chapters describing the arguments of the pessimists’ rivals, (i.e., those that the
volume editors call ‘deniers’ or ‘optimists’) offer a mixed case of hope and despair about rights
protection and rights enforcement, although, in their analyses, hope seems to fade faster, and
despair appears to loom larger. Between pessimism and denialism, the volume’s editors strive to
chart a ‘third way’ but end up in a critique of R2P, its merits and demerits, and its overall
feasibility. Even in volume editors’ analyses, especially in Robert Murray’s (2017) epilogue, the
weight of evidence seems to be against R2P and its future prospects. While POC is shown to be
more viable than R2R, it is hard to see errant states, (i.e., those committing atrocities against their
own citizens), voluntarily letting United Nations peacekeepers come in and restrain them.
Additionally, POC can take on a nefarious form. A case in point is Russian military presence in
Syria as a POC mission, with the consent of the Assad regime. But Russians in Syria are only
protecting the Assad regime (Parlett, 2017) by helping it kill its enemies, (i.e., citizens protesting
its atrocities). One promising way that rights enforcement can yield positive results is to take
geopolitics out of humanitarian intervention. It is, indeed, an ideal aspiration, the realization of
which is even more idealistic.
The critique presented here is by no means meant to detract from the otherwise superb
job that volume editors and contributors have done to highlight the prospects and perils of one of
the most important issue of our time—the enforcement of human rights around the globe. Each
essay in the collection is well-argued, well-presented, and highly readable. Each represents the
rigor of research, conceptual clarity, theoretical grounding, and empirical density, besides being
elegantly written in an impeccable style that grips the reader. The volume is indeed a memorable
work on theory and practice of human rights that will remain a must-read for all those concerned
with rights for years to come.
‘Europeanization’ of Turkey: Judging its Human Rights Regime
While Protecting Human Rights in the 21st Century offers a generalized, big-picture
analysis of rights protection and rights enforcement, it does not address specific cases of human
rights-challenged states, a void that Gozde Yilmaz (2017) fills with her highly sophisticated read
on Minority Rights in Turkey: A Battlefield of Europeanization. Her study presents an insider’s
view of the state of human rights in Turkey that intersects with her doctoral training in Germany
and research in Europe. Yilmaz takes on shifting Turkish policies towards its ethnic and religious
minorities, especially Kurds and Alvis, and explores their internal and external tropes. As Turkey
has long been a European Union candidate state, according to one school of thought, its minority
rights record has steadily improved because of prodding by the European Union. The European
Union wants to see European Union candidate states in Eastern Europe and countries that
straddle Europe and Asia, like Turkey, conform to the norms and values that are central to
democratic Europe, such as respect for basic human rights. Another view is that candidate states
have been mainstreaming their minority policies because of their internal dynamics to the
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exclusion of external influence. The shift in minority policies, according to this view, is either
driven by the high cost of discriminatory policies that fragment societies and rupture interpersonal relations in society, or it is engineered by the obvious benefits of expanding and
respecting the human rights regime by undoing discriminatory policies. The third view, which
Yilmaz productively constructs, is one of convergence of internal and external incentives, the
synergy of which accelerates policy change in the desired direction.
Yilmaz discusses the case of Turkey in great detail not only to inform and educate a
reader who is unfamiliar with the state of minorities in Turkey but also to explain internal and
external dynamics, which she calls ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors. Pull, according to her, constitutes a
top-down influence that trickles down from the European Union to candidate states in order to
influence their minority policies and to bring them up to European standards. Push, on the other
hand, is a bottom-up evaluation of a minority policy in candidate states, which questions its
failure and replaces it with one borrowed from overseas, including European Union states.
Focusing on the case of Turkey, Yilmaz situates her analysis in two sets of regimes in the
country since its transition from an empire to a republic in the 1920s. One set of regimes were
cast in what Yilmaz calls the ‘hyper-secular’ tradition, which was forged under the founder of
Turkey, Ata Turk (Turkish for the father of Turks). This tradition has enjoyed the longest
ascendancy and has continued well into the turn of the century. The second set of regimes began
with the climbing of AJK (the Turkish initials of the ruling Justice and Development Party in
Ankara), which came into power in 2004 and which strove to steer the ship of the state away
from its hyper-secular tradition and closer to its ‘glorious’ Islamic imperial past, enshrined in the
500-year Ottoman Empire. Ironically, the hyper-secular liberal regimes, steeped in hypernationalism, were more restrictive of minority rights than their contemporary Islamic
counterparts. The AJK regime became more enthusiastic, at least initially, about joining the
European Union and liberalizing its policies on minority rights than previous regimes had been.
Even when the AJK regime became frustrated in its ambition to join the European Union, it
continued to liberalize and expand minority rights, as these measures proved advantageous to the
party. One of the most important advantages that Yilmaz has recounted is the electoral one. Set
against the secularist plurality of the country, the AJK turned to ethnic and religious minorities,
non-secular traditional and nationalist communities, and the religious sector of society as its
voting base. This coalition propelled the AJK into power and kept it there, election after election.
To further strengthen its electoral base, the AJK government went on to liberalize the restrictive
minority rights. For the first time, the Kurdish minority was allowed to speak the Kurdish
language as a medium of communication and instruction. On the surface, this may seem an
ordinary gesture, but it was not. For a community that could not read even Islamic scriptures
(including Quran) in its own language for almost a century, letting it speak and write its own
language was a monumental step forward. (In contrast, the preceding hyper-secular governments
in Ankara had enforced the Turkish language as a unifying bedrock to dissolve all subnational
linguistic identities into an overarching ‘we-are-all-Turks-and-Turks-only’ melting pot.)
Temporally, Yilmaz has focused her analysis on 2004-2010 to explore shifts in Turkish
policies on minorities. She has deployed three theoretical models to inform her analysis. Of these,
the most appealing is the ‘pull and push’ model. The other two she described as ‘Drawing
Lessons,’ and ‘Social Learning.’ It appears that neither of these models independently explains
the evolving policy changes in regard to expanding minority rights. She distributes the time
frame of policy changes into three temporal markers and ingeniously stretches each model to
explain policy shifts in temporal bits and pieces. No matter how ingenious the exercise, however,
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she does not seem satisfied by its results. So she crafts a convergent frame—made up of these
three models—to explain evolution in Turkish minority policies. One cannot but empathize with
her in overstretching these models to fit her empirical evidence. As Minority Rights in Turkey is
her dissertation developed into a book, she had to endure the academic tyranny of finding
validity for marginal, even no-name theories, which hardly come across better than educated
guesses. This burden slightly takes away the edge of her otherwise superb analysis of evolving
Turkish policy on minority rights. This apparent weakness of the study, though, lends itself into
an opportunity for her next book, which she should devote to a historical analysis of the evolving
minority policies in Turkey by periodizing them into the following stages of Turkey’s history: its
imperial past, its republican age, and contemporary Islamic-secular heterodoxy. One major
omission in her current analysis is the internal dynamics of shifting policies, such as the struggle
of ethnic and religious minorities themselves, and the major phenomena in the ‘near-abroad’ of
the virtual breakup of the Iraqi and Syrian regimes, leaving the Kurdish minority liberated,
autonomous, and on its way to becoming an independent nation. In her future analysis, she may
address these dynamics and their possible impact on shifts in Turkish policies on minority rights.
Conclusion
The arrival of Protecting Human Rights in the 21st Century and Minority Rights in Turkey
could not be timed better. The simultaneous worldwide rise in the violation of human rights and
the contemporary slide in humanitarian concern add to the urgency of the message that these two
volumes articulate for the protection and enforcement of human rights. In particular, these works
serve as a wake-up call on world governments and world leaders to help arrest the erosion of the
human rights regime, an erosion that is inextricably linked to growing human suffering. The
concept of human security, i.e., freedom from fear and want for every human on this planet, is a
fortifying antidote to the crumbling human rights regime. This concept has the potential to
become the currency of the future realm of human rights, which requires nation-states to expand
their responsibility to protect their citizenry, and not just as the guardians of ‘state sovereignty.’
More importantly, human security requires an economically just world. If the planet remains
divided between the affluent and the impoverished, human security will be no more than a
daydream. Unfortunately, concern for global economic justice or a just world rarely enters into
mainstream human rights debates. A first and fertile step towards the making of a just world will
be for Europe to accept Turkey into the European Union, for which it has already waited too
long.
1

The human rights regime incorporates the galvanized efforts of the international community to promote and guard
human rights, primarily by codifying human rights and protecting them through the legislation of treaties and
institutions, and through the delineation of norms to which all states are expected to adhere or face intervention.
2
In 2011, a UN security council resolution authorized the use of force in Libya to protect civilians from Muammar
Gaddafi’s lethal response to anti-government protest. In March of 2011, a multi-state, NATO-led coalition
implemented a military intervention that ultimately led to the killing and capture of Gaddafi in October of that year.
Currently, however, foreign forces remain in Libya, and the country’s civil war has embroiled international forces in
“mission creep” and ongoing violence.
3
Some critics assert that the current instability in Libya is not the direct result of humanitarian intervention but are
instead tied to subsequent failures of the international community after the intervention.
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